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THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL.
docket under the act of June 26, 1876, which was announced at this term, and is reported in, 3 Cent. L. J.
815.
For convenience it may be well to state the followingagain: The bill was filed in the district court of
Boulder county, June 21, 1876; issue was joined July
24, 1876; the Territory of Colorado became a state by
proclamation of the president, August 1, 1876, and the
last order made at the July term of the Boulder court
was entered August 21,1876. After the motion to docket
the case in this court was denied, and on the 7th of
December, 1876, plaintiffs filed in the state court a petition alleging that they are citizens of Massachusetts
and defendant is a corporation created by a law of the
Territory of Colorado, and other facts substantially as
required by the act of 1875 concerning the removal of
causes from state to federal courts. A bond was also
filed with condition as required by that act, the sufficiency of which was not questioned in this court. Afterwards (Dec..9,1876) plaintiffs files1 in this court a transcript of the files, record and proceedings in the Boulder court and sought to have the cause referred.
Thereupon, December 11, defendant moved to dismiss,
which is here treated as a motion to remand.
E. L. Smith, for the motion; A. JPoppleton and J.
I. Reddick, contra.
HALLETT J.:
This suit was brought in the district court of Boulder county, under the late territorial government, and
the question here presented is, whether it may be removed into this court under the act of Congress of
March 3, 1875. In terms that act extends to cases then
pending or thereafter to be brought in any state court.
This suit was not then pending in any court, nor was
it afterwards brought in a state court, although it came
into such a court by operation of law on the admission
of the state sometime after it was begun.
It was ingeniously urged in the argument at the bar
that, by assenting to the jurisdiction of the state court,
plaintiffs did in fact bring the suit in that court; but
this will not bear examination. The bringing of a suit
is understood to mean the institution or commence
ment of it, and so the language is in R. S., § 639, on the
same subject. This occurred in this instance in a territorial, not a state court. Pending the suit the character of the court was changed into a state court, and
there being nothing in the record to show its federal
character, the court retained jurisdiction of it. S. c.
3 Cent. L. J. 815.
Plaintiffs did hot in any sense bring the suit in or
into the state court. They found it there, where the
law had left it in the transition from a territorial to a
state government, and they consented to go on with it
in that jurisdiction. In that way they elected to remain in the state court; but they did not in any reasonable construction of the act of 1875 bring the suit in
that court. This view is enforced by the circumstance
that Congress has provided a special way of transferring
causes on the admission of a state by general law (R. S.
§§, 567, 569, 704), and also in this instance by the act
establishing this court, June 26, 1876. This legislation,
relating to a particular class of cases and designed to
carry out the general purpose of the removal acts,
seems to proceed on the theory that the latter are not
applicable to cases.which originate in a territorial court.
If Congress had consigned all federal cases fo the state
courts, plaintiffs would be within the reason, if not the
letter, of the removal acts. But this was not done; and
that which was done does not in any way tend to prove
that the removal acts are by construction to be extended to cases like this-i. e., to cases not within their
terms. If, however, this reasoning is unsound, there is
another obstacle to the removal of the cause.

Accepting the act of 1875 as applicable to the case,
by the third section it is provided that the petition for
removal shall be filed in the state court, "before or at
the term at which said cause could be first tried, and
before the trial thereof." The term here referred to
appears to be that at which the cause may be tried or
heard on the merits according to the practice of the
court, without regard to the special circumstances of
the case, as whether the parties are ready for trial, and
the like.
Certainly we can not, in determining a question of
this kind, enter into every circumstance that may delay
or facilitate the progress of a cause, as whether there
are nice points to be decided, which require time for
consideration, whether the court was other~vise occupied, and so on. Such an investigation would be in
every way embarrassing and uncertain as to the result, and therefore it may be dismissed as impracticable. We are then to inquire whether, according to
the practice of the court, this suit could have been
finally heard at the July term of the Boulder court,
without reference to any of those circumstances
that have been mentioned as likely to retard its progress. It appears that issue was joined on the 24th
day of July, 1876, and the court remained in session
for a period of twenty-eight days thereafter.
No time was allowed by rule of court or otherwise for
taking testimony, and we can not assume that any
specific time was necessary. It was claimed at the bar
that our rule, 69, should govern, but that rule was not
of force in the Boulder court. Pahner v. Cowdrey, 2
Col. 1. So far as the record shows, the cause could
have been brought on at any time within the twentyeight days which remained of the term after issue
was joined. If the writer may speak from his own
knowledge of the course of practice in the territorrial
courts, he feels bound to declare that it was entirely
regular to bring a cause to hearing at the term in
which issue was joined, and this was often done, especially in foreclosure suits. It is true that important suits often went over the term; but this was owing
to the press of business, or other extraneous cause,
and not to any rule of practice. It seems, therefore,
that the application to remove the cause was not in
apt time, not being made at the term when a hearing
could have been had.
For these reasons the motion to remand will be
allowed with costs.
DILLON, Circuit Judge:
I concur. I am inclined to think the first ground
sound; but if, under the local law and practice, the
case could have been finally heard at the July term,
then I am clear that the application for removal should
have been made at that term, assuming that the act of
March 3, 1875, applies to the case.
MOTION
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GRISWOLD v. BAY CITY.
Supreme Court Of Michiyau, January Term,

181.

HON. T. 3M.COOLEY, Chief Justice.
It

J. V. CA1MPBELL,)
ISAAC MARSTON,

"

B. F. GRAvES,

"1

'

Associate Justices.

1. IIGHT Or OWNER S or ADJOINING LOTS TO MATERIAL
TAKEN FROM STREETS-SALE OF SAM E BY CITY.-In grad-

ing a street for the purpose of paving, it was necessary to
remove earth which the city had no occasion for, and the
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street commissioner sold the same to a party who removed
and used it. In an action to recover the purchase-price
the purchaser defended, claiming that the city did not own
the earth, but that it was owned by the adjoining lot-owners.
There was no showing that the earth was of any peculiar
value, nor did it appear whether it constituted a part of the
original soil, or was earth which the city had previously
placed in the street. Held, that the defence was not maintainable.
2. RIGHT OF CITY-W1VAIVER.-Where soil is thus taken
from a street in grading it, the city has the right to make
use of it in improving the streets in any part of the city.
If it is not needed for this purpose, and the city disposes
of it by sale without objection by the lot-owners, it will be
presumed, such lot-owners waived any objection they
might have made.
3. WHETHER SOIL TAKEN FROM A STREET and not needed
by the city would rightfully belong to adjacent lot-owners,
is not decided.
ERROR to Bay Circuit.
MARSTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant in error brought an action of assumpsit to
recover the agreed price for a quantity of dirt sold and
delivered under an express contract made by its street
commissioner with plaintiff in error.
It was shown upon the trial in the court below that
the city, for the purpose of paving one of its streets,
lowered the grade thereof, and in doing so it became
necessary to make excavations and remove a large
quantity of the earth in the street, which, not being
needed for city plrposes, was sold to plaintiff in error
and others. The plaintiff in error also offered to show
that the owners of lots alongside of the street never
consented to, or had anything to do with removing the
dirt, or selling the same; that the expense of paving
said street was paid out of the highwayfunds of the city,
and by special assessment on the property along said
street. This evidence was rejected. Certain plats were
offered in evidence to show that this property had never
been legally platted; but it was admitted, that the proprietors had sold and conveyed lots in said city by
deeds duly acknowledged, referring to said plats.
It is insisted that the owner of the lands, over which
a street not legally platted is laid, retains the fee and
all rights not incompatible with the public enjoyment,
and that, while the city might use this dirt for city
purposes, it could not sell it; that one of the main
and leading elements of a sale, viz. title in the city to
the dirt, was lacking, and therefore the city could not
recover.
There are several difficulties with the defense set up.
We can not lose sight of the main features of this case,
and dispose of the controversy with exclusive reference
to the theory that the owner of the lots adjoining
owned to the center of the street subject only to the
public ealement, that the title to the soil removed was
in them, and that the city had no authority to sell the
same. If it appeared that the property taken was of
special value, it might perhaps be fairly inferred that
the owners of the adjoining lots did not consent to a
sale or relinquish their rights therein. But where, as
in this case, the property does not appear to have had
any special or peculiar value, and was taken, used and
disposed of by the city without objection, it is but fair
to presume that the adjoining proprietors took no interest whatever in the disposition that was being -made
of it, and made no claim either for the soil or its proceeds. In such a case, where the party has received
what he bargained for, in an action to recover the
price agreed upon, it is not sufficient for him to show,
in order to defeat the action, that the owners of the
adjoining lots did not consent to the removal and sale;
he should go farther and show that they forbade the
sale. And even if he had shown this to have been the
fact, it is not at all clear that such would have consti-
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tuted a valid defense in this action. The record shows
the soil to have been taken indiscriminately from all
along the line of the street. Under such circumstances
it would be very difficult for the several owners to trace
into the possession of plaintiff in error that portion of
the soil taken from off the street in front of their lots
respectively, and maintain an action against him either
for the identical soil taken or its value. It may be
worthy of serious consideration whether their remedy,
if any, would not be against the commissioner who removed the soil, or the city; but upon this point we
express no opinion.
It may be a question admitting of some doubt, also,
whether there is in fact anything in the record tending
to show that the dirt sold and delivered was a part of
the soil excavated in grading the streets for pavement.
The fact that the person who made the contract with
plaintiff in error, was, and had been for a number of
years, street commissioner, and as such had charge of
this street, would not fully warrant the inference
assumed by the plaintiff in error. For ought that appears, the dirt in question may before then have been
placed upon this street by the city; certainly there is
nothing to show that it ever formed a part of the
original soil over which this street passed, or that the
owners of property fronting upon said street had or
claimed any interest whatever, at any time, therein.
We can not assume that any other person having an
interest in the dirt sold, or that the city, by its commissioner, did not in fact have full authority to sell and
deliver the same to plaintiffin error. But we need not
dispose of this case on any such technical reason.
If, in grading this street, it became necessary to
remove any soil, the city would have had an undoubted
right to use the same in grading that or any other street
in the city. In case it did not desire it for such purpose, and the owner of the. property from in front of
which it has been taken did not, then the city would
have a clear right to remove it, and might in so doing
sell or dispose of it in any way it considered proper.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
NOTE.-Several cases have recently been decided, in
which have been involved the respective rights of the pub.
lic and of adjacent lot-owners in any material that may not
be required in its original sits in the public way for the
purpose of constructing the way, or of keeping it in repair, and the questions are of sufficient importance to justify their being notice-I together. It is conceded on alt
hands that the owner of the land, overwhich the public
passes, retains at the common law the fee and all rights of
property not incompatible with the public enjoyment of the
casement. Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Str. 1004; Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 133; Grose v. West, 7 Taunton, 39; Doe v.
Pearsy, 7 B. & 0. 304; U. S. v. Harris, 1 Sumner, 21; Harris
v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498;
Chatham v. Brainerd, 11 Conn. 60. "Every use to which
the land may be applied, and all the proilts which may be
derived from it consistently with the continuance of the
easement, the owner can lawfully claim." Parsons, C. J.,
in Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454, 456; Lane v. Kennedy,
13 Ohio, N. S. 42; Phifer v. Cox, 21 Ohio, N. S. 248; Higgins
v. Reynolds, 31 N. Y. 151; Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336;
Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 49; Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 257;
bhamberlain v. Enfleld, 43 N. It. 356.
The herbage in the highway belongs to the owner of the
adjoining lands, and he may maintain trespass against one
whose cattle graze upon it (Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass.
33; Cool v. Crommet, 1 Shep. 250; Avery v. 1axwefl, 4 N.
H. 36; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165), unless the law under which the highway was laid out contemplates the running at large of cattle in the highway. Tonawanda If. R.
Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255. The growing trees in the
highway also belong to the adjoining owner, except as they
are needed for the purpose of making the way (Adams v.
Emerson, 6 Pick. 56; Sanderson v. Haverstick, s Pa. St.
294; Overman v. May, 35 Iowa, 89; Commissioners, etc., v.
Beckwith, 10 Kas. 603), and if the highway offieer sell trees
growing in the road, and they are cut without necessity,
they are liable in trespass for so doing. Clark v. Dasse, 34
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Mich. 86. See further, Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns, 447;
Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cowen, 238; Williams v. N. Y. C. R.R.
Co., 16N. Y. 103; Dubuque v. Malony, 9 Iowa, 450; Dubuque
v. Benson, 23 Iowa, 248; White v. Godfrey, 97 Mass. 472:
Bliss v. Ball, 99 Mass. 597; Makepeace v. Worden, 1 N. H.
16;Woodring v. Forks Town, 28 Pa. St. 355; Read v. Leeds,
19Conn.182; Kellogg v. Malin, 50 Mo. 500. In Codman v.
Evans, 5 Allen, 308, it was decided that the owner of land
might maintain an action against an adjoining owner who
built a bay window extending over his line, notwithstanding that portion of the land covered by the bay window
was laid out and used as a highway. In Kentucky, it has
been decided that the owner of land over which a highway
runs, may work mines therein, not interfering with the
public use. West Covington v. Freking, 8 Bush. 126.
The question is different somewhat when the public way
is a city or village street, and where the law under whi ch
it has been laid out appropriates not an easement merely,
but the title in fee. It has been decided in Iowa, in such a
case, that the complete ownership and dominion passed to
the munincipal corporation by such an appropriation, and
that, if a deposit of minerals should exist beneath the surface and be worked by the adjoining proprietor, the Corporation might recover from him the value of what should
be taken from it. Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa, 234; see also
Milburn v. Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa, 246. Compare Moses v.
Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Go.21111. 516; West v. Bancroft, 32 Vt.
367; Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 989; Hinchman v. Patterson, etc., R. Co., 2 C. E. Green, 76; State
v. Laverack, 34 N. J., 201.
We do not find that this peculiar question has been
passed upon elsewhere under like circumstances; but the
view taken in Michigan of the public rights in streets under statutes, which vest the fee in the county where lands
are dedicated to the public use by a town plat, seems to be
different from that taken in Iowa. It is conceded that a
dedication or an appropriation for street purposes is not
for purposes of passage merely, but for all the public purposes for which it is customary or proper to make use of
city or village streets. Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich.
24. But from this case, as well as others which have not
passed explicitly upon the question, the inference is fairly
deducible that the public would not be recognized as having the fee, except for public purposes. In Cuming v.
Prang, 24 Mich. 514, it was decided that the city authorities
had no right to empower a contractor, for the improvement
of a street in one part of the city, to take for the purpose
gravel from an alley in another part of the city, and that
the owner of the lot bounded on the alley might maintain
an action for the value of the gravel taken. Compare Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90. The decision would probably not
have been the same, had the locus been a street instead of
an alley; there are some important differences between the
two. See People v.Jackson, 7 Mich. 432; Tillman v. People, 12 Mich. 401. In Bissell v. Collins, 28 Mich. 277, the
right ol the city, in making a street improvement, to take the
natural material within the street limits and distribute it
wherever it was needed in completing the work, was fully
recognized. But this right would have existed, had the
public had an easement only. New Haven v. Sargent, 38
Conn.50.
The principal case was decided on a somewhat narrow
ground, but it approaches a question which therq will
probably be occasion to consider in future cases.
T. B. C.

BANKRUPTCY-FIDUOLkRY DEBTS.
WOOLSEY v. CADE.
Supreme Court of Alabama, December, 1876.
l[o .R. C. BRICKELL, Chief Justice.
T-"NG, I Associate Justices.
A.
W.
"
GOW.SONE,
A debt due from a factor for the proceeds of goods sold
is not within sec. 33 of the Bankrupt Act (Rev. Stats. §
5117), which provides that "no debt created by the fraud
or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as
a public officer, or while actingin anyflduciary character,shall
be discharged by any proceedings in bankruptcy." In re
Seymour, 1 N. B. R. 29, disapproved. Cronan v. Cotting, 101
Mass, 245, followed.

BRICKELL, C. J., delivered the opinioft of the court:

The first section of the bankrupt law of 1841 provided: "All persons whatsoever, residing in any state,
territory, or district of the United States, owing debts,
which shall not have been created in consequence of a
defalcation as a public officer, or as executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, or while acting in any
other fiduciary capacity," should, on compliance with
its terms, receive a discharge from the payment of
debts. The exception was of debts, from the operation of the discharge; not of persons owing such
debts, from the privileges of the law. In Chapman
v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202, the Supreme Court of the
United States determined that a debt due from a factor
to his principal, for moneys received on a sale of cotton,
was not a debt created by defalcation in a fiduciary
capacity, and was within the operation of the bankrupt's discharge. The decision was followed in Austill
& Marshall v. Crawford, 7 Ala. 335. It was urged by
counsel, in the argument of that case, that the law of
this state, the parties residing and contracting, and the
agency having been executed here, must fix the character of the relation of factors to their principals, and
of the debts due from them in the execution of their
agency. The statute punishing criminally a willful
conversion, by a factor, of the goods or moneys of his
principal, it was insisted, fixed the character of the
debt due from him, as created in consequence of a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. It was
said by the court, the pleadings did not disclose the
offence punishable by the statute; but, independent of
that consideration, the operation and construction of
the bankrupt law must be the same all over the United
States, not varied by the local laws of the several states;
and the meaning of the terms employed in it must be
ascertained from the common law.
The 33d section (§ 5117 of the Rev. Sts.) of the present
bankrupt law declares: "No debt created by the fraud
or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation
as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary
character, shall be discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy," etc. The current of decision is, that a claim
against a factor, for withholding the proceeds of the
sales of goods consigned to him to be sold on commission, is a debt contracted by him in a fiduciary character, excepted from the operation of a discharge in
bankruptcy. The decisions are collected in Bump on
Bankruptcy (9th Ed.), 724. See also Treadwell[ v. HotThe
loway, 46 Cal. 547; s. c., 12 Nat. Bank. Reg. 61.
difference of decision under the present law, from that
prevailing under the law of 1841, is founded on the difference in the phraseology, and the reason of it is thius
expressed by Judge Blatchford, whose opinion is the
authority on which the other and subsequent concurring opinions rely. "The act of 1841 excluded from
its benefits 'all persons owing debts created in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer, or as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting
in any fiduciary capacity.' The Supreme Court held,
in Chapman v. Forsyth, that a discharge under the
act of 1841 did not release the bankrupt from any
such debts, and that no debt fell within the description of a debt created by a defalcation while acting
in any other fiduciary capacity, unless it was created
by a defalcation while acting in a capacity of the
same class and character as the capacity of executor,
administrator, guardian and trustee. The court held
that the language of the act of 1841 was not broad
enough to include every fiduciary capacity, but was
limited to fiduciary capacities of a specified standard
or character. That was clearly so under that act. But,
in the act of 1867, the language seems to have been
intentionally made so broad as to extend to a debt
created by a defalcation of the bankrupt, and while

